A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas

DOI10.1287/moor.2015.0751zbMath1341.91107OpenAlexW2255996700MaRDI QIDQ2806830

Tamás Fleiner, Naoyuki Kamiyama

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3af2425f17574e2b5d248b31783b55a06255f32b

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchinglower quotamatroid kernel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (17)

The popular matching and condensation problems under matroid constraints ⋮ Popularity in the generalized hospital residents setting ⋮ A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem ⋮ Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting ⋮ A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas ⋮ Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints ⋮ A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures ⋮ Envy-free matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis ⋮ Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints ⋮ Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms ⋮ Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy ⋮ Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Matroidal Choice Functions

Cites Work

• The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
• Linear programming brings marital bliss
• Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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