An optimal strong equilibrium solution for cooperative multi-leader-follower Stackelberg Markov chains games

DOI10.14736/kyb-2016-2-0258zbMath1374.35201OpenAlexW2345924723MaRDI QIDQ2810184

Kristal K. Trejo, Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak

Publication date: 31 May 2016

Published in: Kybernetika (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10338.dmlcz/145774

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainsstrong equilibrium\(L_p\)-normStackelberg and Nash

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Controllability (93B05) Initial-boundary value problems for second-order parabolic equations (35K20)

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