STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12166zbMath1404.91155OpenAlexW2343877026WikidataQ123021277 ScholiaQ123021277MaRDI QIDQ2812311

Oliver Gürtler, Jed Devaro

Publication date: 16 June 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12166

zbMATH Keywords

firmsspecializationworkersmultitaskingproduct market volatility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Specialist vs. generalist: efficiency in multitasking

Cites Work

• Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism
• HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND THE TRANSITION FROM SPECIALIZATION TO MULTITASKING
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN

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