Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm

DOI10.1090/noti1075zbMath1338.91084OpenAlexW3121700742MaRDI QIDQ2813239

Christian Klamler, D. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 15 June 2016

Published in: Notices of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/noti1075

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (13)

Two-person fair division of indivisible items when envy-freeness is impossible ⋮ Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing ⋮ Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups ⋮ Computational complexity of necessary envy-freeness ⋮ Countering negotiation power asymmetries by using the adjusted winner algorithm ⋮ Allocation of indivisible items with individual preference graphs ⋮ Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation ⋮ Allocating indivisible items with minimum dissatisfaction on preference graphs ⋮ Fair Division ⋮ Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents ⋮ Proportional Borda allocations ⋮ Obtaining a proportional allocation by deleting items ⋮ The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division

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