Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.01.010zbMath1369.91103OpenAlexW648857831MaRDI QIDQ281343

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp15_9.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstrategy-proofnessdomain restrictionhouse allocationprice restrictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments ⋮ Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ A matching method for second-hand goods exchange considering loss aversion of buyer and seller in e-brokerage

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