Informational herding with model misspecification

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.01.011zbMath1369.91156OpenAlexW2266195732MaRDI QIDQ281347

J. Aislinn Bohren

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-007.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

model misspecificationinformational herdingobservational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (8)

Learning with misattribution of reference dependence ⋮ Biased learning under ambiguous information ⋮ The probability of pluralistic ignorance ⋮ Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems ⋮ Which misspecifications persist? ⋮ A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence ⋮ Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models ⋮ Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures

Cites Work

• Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs
• Social learning in a changing world
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
• Non-Bayesian Learning
• First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
• Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
• Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Reaching a Consensus
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Limiting Behavior of Posterior Distributions when the Model is Incorrect
• Self-Correcting Information Cascades

This page was built for publication: Informational herding with model misspecification