A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.002zbMath1369.91012OpenAlexW99431088MaRDI QIDQ281360

Akira Okada

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26008/070econDP13-15.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamesincomplete informationBayesian bargaining problemex post Nash bargaining solutionmechanism selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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