Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.005zbMath1369.91072OpenAlexW3124802445MaRDI QIDQ281369

Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57576/1/allpay_20151124.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiesall-pay auctionscontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information ⋮ On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals ⋮ Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux ⋮ A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders

Cites Work

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• Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
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• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

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