Mechanism design and intentions
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Publication:281379
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013zbMath1369.91063OpenAlexW3125596586MaRDI QIDQ281379
Nick Netzer, Felix J. Bierbrauer
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013
Related Items (10)
An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity ⋮ Ex-post implementation with social preferences ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Agreements with reciprocity: co-financing and MOUs ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Reciprocity with uncertainty about others
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