Limits of acyclic voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.004zbMath1369.91054OpenAlexW2289926752MaRDI QIDQ281385

John Duggan

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityvotingpreference aggregationArrow's theorempositive responsiveness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

An algebraic approach to revealed preference ⋮ Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters ⋮ Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom

Cites Work

• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Limits of acyclic voting