Bounded memory folk theorem

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.03.001zbMath1369.91018OpenAlexW2293420227MaRDI QIDQ281393

Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian, Mehmet Barlo

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/811107/14/bm150804.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbounded rationalitymemoryfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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