Bounded memory folk theorem
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Publication:281393
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.03.001zbMath1369.91018OpenAlexW2293420227MaRDI QIDQ281393
Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian, Mehmet Barlo
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/811107/14/bm150804.pdf
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