Common belief foundations of global games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007zbMath1369.91029OpenAlexW3123976292MaRDI QIDQ281404

F. Blanchet-Sadri, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityglobal gameshigher-order beliefsrank beliefsrisk-dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (8)

The value of a coordination game ⋮ ILLIQUIDITY COMPONENT OF CREDIT RISK - THE 2015 LAWRENCE R. KLEIN LECTURE ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Dynamic coordination with individual learning ⋮ Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté ⋮ Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. ⋮ Coordination with Local Information

Cites Work

• A contraction principle for finite global games
• Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements

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