Optimal sequential delegation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.009zbMath1369.91114OpenAlexW2130330431MaRDI QIDQ281407

Eugen Kováč, Daniel Krähmer

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designnon-transferable utilityoptimal delegationsequential screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Money burning in the theory of delegation ⋮ Transfer of authority within hierarchies ⋮ The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

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