Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
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Publication:281414
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.011zbMath1369.91055OpenAlexW2313667674MaRDI QIDQ281414
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.011
Related Items
A decomposition of strategy-proofness, On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions, An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions, Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains, Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains, Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”, Ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatible voting rules with correlated belief under betweenness property, The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules, Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model, On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences, Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs, Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
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