Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
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Publication:2817220
DOI10.1080/02331934.2016.1147035zbMath1415.91027OpenAlexW2407433475MaRDI QIDQ2817220
José Miguel Giménez, Margarita Domènech, María Jesús de la Puente
Publication date: 29 August 2016
Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/89025
Related Items (6)
On the axiomatic characterization of the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values ⋮ The prediction value ⋮ New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value ⋮ Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games ⋮ A note on multinomial probabilistic values ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
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