CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

DOI10.1111/IERE.12175zbMath1404.91185OpenAlexW2112152205MaRDI QIDQ2819274

Bhaskar Dutta, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 28 September 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/83244/1/WRAP_8779629-ec-310117-b_dutta_bzzapril10_15.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitystrategic learningoptimal diffusionfinite connected networkperfect Bayes equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Applications of graph theory (05C90) Economics of information (91B44) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (4)

False information from near and far ⋮ Retracted article: ``A distance vector similarity metric for complex networks ⋮ A survey on nonstrategic models of opinion dynamics ⋮ On decay centrality

Cites Work

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• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning from Neighbours
• Technology diffusion by learning from neighbours
• Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning

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