DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY

DOI10.1111/IERE.12179zbMath1404.91131OpenAlexW2498626077MaRDI QIDQ2819280

David Wettstein, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 28 September 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171310

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationprivate informationcontest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Biased contests for symmetric players ⋮ Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Symmetric mechanism design ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests ⋮ Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• All-Pay Contests
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort

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