INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12184zbMath1404.91137OpenAlexW3123050485MaRDI QIDQ2819287

Alessandro Citanna, Paolo Siconolfi

Publication date: 28 September 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12184

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionefficient price systemsinsurance economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (5)

An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection

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• A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
• Incentives, Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms
• Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks

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