The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_11zbMath1403.91069arXiv1605.01510OpenAlexW2346929692MaRDI QIDQ2819453

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.01510

zbMATH Keywords

non-atomic network routing gamesworst-case latency deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (5)

Toll caps in privatized road networks ⋮ Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games ⋮ Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

Cites Work

• Equilibrium routing under uncertainty
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
• The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games
• A Mean-Risk Model for the Traffic Assignment Problem with Stochastic Travel Times
• Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
• Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy

This page was built for publication: The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games