Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_14zbMath1403.91027OpenAlexW2509027853MaRDI QIDQ2819457

Yoram Bachrach, Joel Oren, Yair Zick, Yuval Filmus

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_14

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesweighted voting gamesgroup decision making, Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (4)

On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights ⋮ Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation ⋮ Average weights and power in weighted voting games

Cites Work

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• Reliability Weighted Voting Games
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• False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• Sharing Rewards in Cooperative Connectivity Games
• False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
• NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

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