Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15zbMath1403.91132OpenAlexW2507751917MaRDI QIDQ2819458

Reshef Meir

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15

zbMATH Keywords

iterative votingacyclicity in gamesiterative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

Cites Work

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