Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_20zbMath1403.91152OpenAlexW2517441635MaRDI QIDQ2819463

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_20

zbMATH Keywords

greedy algorithmspricing problemasymmetric buyers with budgetsmonopoly market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (3)

On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• On the equal-subset-sum problem
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
• Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets
• Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
• Single-minded unlimited supply pricing on sparse instances
• Envy-Free Pricing in Multi-item Markets

This page was built for publication: Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets