SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_21zbMath1403.91183arXiv1607.05139OpenAlexW2512243675MaRDI QIDQ2819464

Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi, Yonatan Aumann

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.05139

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionmechanism designsocial welfarebudget balancespatially distributed marketgain from trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best ⋮ Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms ⋮ Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

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