Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_23zbMath1403.91179arXiv1512.04277OpenAlexW2294314374MaRDI QIDQ2819466

Paolo Penna, Matúš Mihalák, Peter Widmayer

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04277

zbMATH Keywords

monetary transferbinary allocationbribeproof mechanismpath auctiontwo-values domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement, Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

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