Designing Cost-Sharing Methods for Bayesian Games
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Publication:2819469
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_26zbMath1403.91022OpenAlexW2507438144MaRDI QIDQ2819469
Alkmini Sgouritsa, George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi
Publication date: 29 September 2016
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1182124
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
Related Items (3)
Unnamed Item ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games ⋮ Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost Sharing
Cites Work
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