Hash-Function Based PRFs: AMAC and Its Multi-User Security
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Publication:2820497
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_22zbMath1385.94010OpenAlexW2505511021MaRDI QIDQ2820497
Daniel J. Bernstein, Stefano Tessaro, Mihir Bellare
Publication date: 9 September 2016
Published in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_22
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