How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?

DOI10.1142/S0219198916500080zbMath1391.91104OpenAlexW2328439421MaRDI QIDQ2822035

Emily Tanimura, Sylvie Thoron

Publication date: 26 September 2016

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500080

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionoutside optiondisagreementnoncooperative bargaining theoryraiffa bargaining solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

Cites Work

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• Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
• An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
• Generalized Raiffa solutions
• Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
• Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

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