Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1142/S0219198916500079zbMath1391.91101OpenAlexW2316376721MaRDI QIDQ2822037

Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen

Publication date: 26 September 2016

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500079

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyincentive compatibilitybudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

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