On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents

DOI10.1016/j.entcs.2011.10.017zbMath1347.68337OpenAlexW2023074074WikidataQ113318187 ScholiaQ113318187MaRDI QIDQ2825419

Dario Della Monica, Margherita Napoli

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2011.10.017

zbMATH Keywords

model checkingmulti-agent systemsbounded resourcescoalition formationscoalition logics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Temporal logic (03B44) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (11)

Trustworthy online shopping with price impact ⋮ Model-checking for resource-bounded ATL with production and consumption of resources ⋮ Characterization, verification and generation of strategies in games with resource constraints ⋮ State of the Art in Logics for Verification of Resource-Bounded Multi-Agent Systems ⋮ Verifying Systems of Resource-Bounded Agents ⋮ Formal modelling and verification of probabilistic resource bounded agents ⋮ Coalition formation in social environments with logic-based agents1 ⋮ Strategic reasoning with a bounded number of resources: the quest for tractability ⋮ The virtues of idleness: a decidable fragment of resource agent logic ⋮ On the complexity of resource-bounded logics ⋮ Knowing the price of success

Cites Work

• Solving coalitional resource games
• On the (un-)decidability of model-checking resource-bounded agents
• Expressing Properties of Resource-Bounded Systems: The Logics RTL * and RTL
• Logic for coalitions with bounded resources
• Alternating-time temporal logic
• A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games
• Alternating-time temporal logic with resource bounds

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