An Epistemic Logic of Extensive Games

DOI10.1016/j.entcs.2011.10.019zbMath1348.91025OpenAlexW2042001364WikidataQ113318184 ScholiaQ113318184MaRDI QIDQ2825421

Emiliano Lorini, Frederic Moisan

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2011.10.019

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitybackward inductionepistemic logicextensive-form gamesAumann's theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Characterization, verification and generation of strategies in games with resource constraints ⋮ A logical characterization of extensive games with short sight ⋮ A history based logic for dynamic preference updates ⋮ Modeling reasoning in a social setting ⋮ An Epistemic Logic of Extensive Games

Cites Work

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• RATIONAL DYNAMICS AND EPISTEMIC LOGIC IN GAMES
• Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction

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