Mechanism design with approximate valuations

DOI10.1145/2090236.2090240zbMath1348.91119OpenAlexW2163989148MaRDI QIDQ2826042

Alessandro Chiesa, Zeyuan Allen Zhu, Silvio Micali

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2090236.2090240

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (4)

Robust and approximately stable marriages under partial information ⋮ Making the Most of Your Samples ⋮ Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs ⋮ Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching

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