Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy

DOI10.1145/2090236.2090254zbMath1348.91124arXiv1004.2888OpenAlexW2196697156WikidataQ59379650 ScholiaQ59379650MaRDI QIDQ2826057

Kobbi Nissim, Moshe Tennenholtz, Rann Smorodinsky

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.2888

zbMATH Keywords

facility locationmechanism designdifferential privacymonopolist pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (17)

Heterogeneous facility location without money ⋮ Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games ⋮ Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions ⋮ Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line ⋮ On the properties that characterize privacy ⋮ Extreme points of the local differential privacy polytope ⋮ A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games ⋮ Scheduling without payments ⋮ The anarchy of scheduling without money ⋮ Ensuring privacy with constrained additive noise by minimizing Fisher information ⋮ Smart Contract-Driven Mechanism Design to Mitigate Information Diffusion in Social Networks ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy ⋮ The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection

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