Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions

DOI10.1145/2090236.2090257zbMath1348.91118OpenAlexW2122563862MaRDI QIDQ2826060

Silvio Micali, Pablo D. Azar, Jing Chen

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2090236.2090257

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Designing Markets for Daily Deals ⋮ Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions ⋮ The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment

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