When manufacturers hold information back from strong suppliers

DOI10.1051/ro/2015050zbMath1351.90025OpenAlexW2413255837MaRDI QIDQ2826664

Xavier Brusset

Publication date: 18 October 2016

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2015050

zbMATH Keywords

supply chainsStackelberg model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

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• A bargaining model with asymmetric information for a single supplier-single buyer problem
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• Strategic information sharing in a supply chain
• Estimating the supply chain efficiency loss when the seller has to estimate the buyer’s willingness to pay
• Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
• Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

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