Approval Voting in Large Electorates

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_9zbMath1348.91108OpenAlexW130358381MaRDI QIDQ2829682

Matías Núñez

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections ⋮ Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting ⋮ Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference

Cites Work

• Handbook on approval voting
• Approval voting: three examples
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Large Poisson games
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

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