Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17zbMath1348.91098OpenAlexW1628982882MaRDI QIDQ2829690

Jean-François Laslier, François Maniquet

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference

Cites Work

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• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

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