Equilibrium in an individual - societal SIR vaccination model in presence of discounting and finite vaccination capacity

DOI10.1142/9789813142862_0015zbMath1349.92141OpenAlexW2433662786MaRDI QIDQ2829843

Ghozlane Yahiaoui, Gabriel Turinici, Laetitia Laguzet

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: New Trends in Differential Equations, Control Theory and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813142862_0015

zbMATH Keywords

SIR modelmean field gamesoptimal vaccination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30) Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34)

Related Items (4)

Finite state graphon games with applications to epidemics ⋮ Optimal Incentives to Mitigate Epidemics: A Stackelberg Mean Field Game Approach ⋮ Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination ⋮ Contact rate epidemic control of COVID-19: an equilibrium view

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