Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-41168-2_1zbMath1479.91088OpenAlexW2194778697MaRDI QIDQ2830053

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 9 November 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41168-2_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Welfare economics (91B15) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Item bidding for combinatorial public projects ⋮ Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions

Cites Work

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• Item bidding for combinatorial public projects
• Strong price of anarchy
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
• Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
• Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
• An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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