Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1509zbMath1348.91117OpenAlexW2372440949MaRDI QIDQ2830748

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Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1509

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcompetitive equilibrianonquasilinear utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
• The core of the matching game
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
• A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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