A generalization of Nash's theorem with higher-order functionals

DOI10.1098/rspa.2013.0041zbMath1348.91078arXiv1301.4845OpenAlexW2136744801WikidataQ51204351 ScholiaQ51204351MaRDI QIDQ2831257

Julian Hedges

Publication date: 2 November 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.4845

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumhigher-order functionnormal-form gameselection function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Higher-type and set recursion theory (03D65)

Cites Work

• Sequential games and optimal strategies
• Selection functions, bar recursion and backward induction
• Strongly majorizable functionals of finite type: A model for barrecursion containing discontinuous functionals
• On the computational content of the axiom of choice
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces

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