Optimal Contract Design for an Efficient Secondary Spectrum Market

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14zbMath1268.91097OpenAlexW70792316MaRDI QIDQ2840933

Shang-Pin Sheng, Mingyan Liu

Publication date: 24 July 2013

Published in: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14

zbMATH Keywords

incentivescontract designsecondary spectrum marketquality of service constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
• Dynamic Contract Trading in Spectrum Markets
• Optimality of Myopic Sensing in Multichannel Opportunistic Access

This page was built for publication: Optimal Contract Design for an Efficient Secondary Spectrum Market