A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17zbMath1268.91034OpenAlexW1827202415MaRDI QIDQ2840937

Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat, Ralf Borndörfer, Bertrand Omont

Publication date: 24 July 2013

Published in: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gamepolymatrix gamecontrols in transportation networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Application models in control theory (93C95) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (6)

An extended network interdiction problem for optimal toll control ⋮ Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors ⋮ A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ A kernel search matheuristic to solve the discrete leader-follower location problem ⋮ Exact Solution of the Evasive Flow Capturing Problem ⋮ Moving towards a more accurate level of inspection against fare evasion in \textit{proof-of-payment} transit systems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An IP approach to toll enforcement optimization on German motorways
• On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem

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