On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation

DOI10.1613/jair.3896zbMath1269.68057DBLPjournals/jair/BetzlerSU13arXiv1402.0580OpenAlexW3099446300WikidataQ61586184 ScholiaQ61586184MaRDI QIDQ2842192

Nadja Betzler, Johannes Uhlmann, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 13 August 2013

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.0580

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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