On avoiding vote swapping

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0923-2zbMath1391.91073OpenAlexW1730273899MaRDI QIDQ284364

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 18 May 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0923-2

zbMATH Keywords

gerrymanderingmanipulation of electionrepresentative democracyvote swapping

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

Cites Work

• Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
• Vote trading in public elections
• Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
• Two-stage discrete aggregation: The Ostrogorski paradox and related phenomena
• Vote trading and subset sums
• Axiomatic districting
• Consistent representative democracy
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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