Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0926-zzbMath1391.91107OpenAlexW1926642773MaRDI QIDQ284366

Ivan Balbuzanov

Publication date: 18 May 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/120621

zbMATH Keywords

convex strategyproofnessprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom serial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Unnamed Item

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