The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
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Publication:284375
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0930-3zbMath1403.91136OpenAlexW2224949037MaRDI QIDQ284375
Publication date: 18 May 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0930-3
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