A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation
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Publication:284382
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0934-zzbMath1391.91085OpenAlexW2236574745MaRDI QIDQ284382
Publication date: 18 May 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0934-z
Related Items (2)
Bi-utility representable orderings on a countable set ⋮ A characterization of two-agent Pareto representable orderings
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