Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games

DOI10.2478/v10006-011-0026-xzbMath1272.91030OpenAlexW2022024689MaRDI QIDQ2845110

Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak

Publication date: 22 August 2013

Published in: International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10006-011-0026-x

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbest replyforward decision processLyapunov equilibrium pointLyapunov game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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