Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders
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Publication:2849317
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_24zbMath1395.68136OpenAlexW33083968MaRDI QIDQ2849317
Maria Kyropoulou, Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis
Publication date: 17 September 2013
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/23659/1/arxiv-final-TOCT-3OAD.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
Cites Work
- An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
- On the Approximability of Budgeted Allocations and Improved Lower Bounds for Submodular Welfare Maximization and GAP
- Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- On optimal single-item auctions
- Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Some optimal inapproximability results
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