GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400185zbMath1275.91082DBLPjournals/igtr/Thomson13WikidataQ59972699 ScholiaQ59972699MaRDI QIDQ2852568

William Thomson

Publication date: 9 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyproportional ruleconstrained equal awards ruleclaims problemsconsistent extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

A precedence constraint value revisited ⋮ On the Shapley value of liability games ⋮ A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims ⋮ Decentralization and mutual liability rules ⋮ NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle ⋮ Proportional rules for state contingent claims ⋮ Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility ⋮ Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility ⋮ Liability games ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update ⋮ From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Cites Work

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• The minimal overlap rule revisited
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• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
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• The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set
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• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
• HOW TO COPE WITH DIVISION PROBLEMS UNDER INTERVAL UNCERTAINTY OF CLAIMS?
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, the Core, and NTU Bankruptcy Problems

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